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Abstract-Theories and models play important roles in the development and refinement of 
knowledge. This paper distinguishes between the two terms and illustrates them. A theory 
of the operator in human-machine systems, posed in the predicate calculus, is developed. 
Six axioms address multitask behavior and the response to events. A model of the theory 
is defined set-theoretically. Issues and implications are briefly explored. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scientists and engineers seek to acquire and refine knowledge for the purposes of under- 
standing, prediction, and control. They use theories and models as important tools in this 
process. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it draws a distinction between theories and 
models and briefly describes the role they take in knowledge refinement. The major portion, 
however, is concerned with the mechanics of that process. In it is developed a theory of the 
operator in human-machine systems. The theory is stated in the first-order predicate calculus 
to provide a wide scope yet to allow precise, unambiguous statements to be made. Next, a 
model of the theory, a bicycle rider, is defined. Finally, issues and implications raised by the 
theory and its model are briefly discussed. 
THEORIES AND MODELS 
While the engineer is usually somewhat more pragmatic than the scientist, they are both 
vitally interested in the development and refinement of knowledge. Theories and models play 
an important role in these processes. 
A theory is a collection of statements about a subject domain. This definition is consistent 
with those of Achinstein [ 11, Chang and Keisler [2], and Suppes [3]. The statements of a theory 
may be posed in a natural language such as Chinese or French, a purely formal language 
such as FORTRAN or the first order predicate calculus, a mathematical language such as 
those of differential equations or probability theory, or some combination of these. The 
empirical theories of most scientists and engineers are usually formulated in a combination 
of a natural language and the language of an appropriate form of mathematics. Of course, 
the language chosen in which to make the statements of the theory will have an important 
effect on the utility of the theory as well as its acceptance by the scientific and engineering 
communities. 
Logicians, such as Tarski [4], identify important theory components as primitive or 
undefined terms, defined terms, axioms (the basic assumptions of a theory), and theorems. 
In deductive theories, theorems result from the application of a logical calculus (rules of logic) 
to the axioms. A deductive theory is closed under its logical calculus. Empirical theories, while 
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not independent on deductive logic, rely heavily on observation and inductive logic for their 
theorems. 
The term “model” is very important to engineers and scientists and it appears in many 
seemingly contradictory contexts. Kaplan [5] and Suppes [6] both present surveys of the 
meanings and uses of the term in the scientific and mathematical literature. 
For example, a physical analog is often called a model. A model airplane or the physical 
analog of a molecule both preserve known and presumed properties of the systems they 
represent. Similarly, conceptual models, like the physicist’s imaginary mass and spring, 
preserve important properties of systems of interest. Most problematic, though, is the use of 
the term model to refer to any precisely stated (e.g. mathematical) description of a subject 
domain. For example, a set of differential equations used to describe the number of 
inhabitants in an urban area is often referred to as a population model. 
Suppes [6] raises the natural. question concerning whether or not these widely varying 
senses of the term model can be reconciled. He concludes that, by taking the perspectives of 
the logicians (Tarski [4]) and the model theorists (Chang and Keisler [2]) there is a unifying 
definition. 
Quite simply, a model of a theory is a structure in which the statements of the theory are 
interpreted as true. If a theory describes the physical characteristics of an airplane, an 
accurate scale model of that airplane will satisfy the theory. A map is a model of a theory 
of a region of land. A computer simulation can be a model of a theory of population dynamics 
posed in differential equations. Note that by this definition, if a theory speaks about a system, 
the system itself is a model of that theory. Przelecki [7] calls this the proper or intended model 
of the theory. 
Theories and models can have an important impact on knowledge development and 
refinement. The first step in this process of inquiry is to obtain relatively unstructured 
information about the subject domain. This is then organized into a theory, using a suitable 
language. Next, models of the theory are studied. These models may include the subject 
domain itself, they may include other existing structures, or they may be constructed by the 
researcher, as are simulation models. In any case, these models must satisfy at least portions 
of the theory. 
If, through the study of these models, it is determined that some statements of the theory 
are violated, one of two conclusions must be drawn. Either the model is wrong (in which case 
it would not really be a model) or the theory is wrong. Also, by directly comparing other 
models with the subject domain, similar discrepancies can be observed which must lead to 
the same alternative conclusions. 
By multiple passes through these steps, knowledge is refined. Statements of the theory are 
dropped and replaced. Occasionally the entire theory must be replaced. One can see evidence 
of the process in many examples from the history of science. 
Since a theory does play such a crucial role in the process of inquiry, the selection of an 
appropriate language is essential. While most considerations are highly situation-dependent, 
two general observations can be made. First, the language must be general enough to speak 
about all relevant aspects of the subject domain. A language chosen solely for its convenience 
or familiarity may be too constrained to address issues which play an important role in the 
area of interest. 
Equally important is the precision of the language. A theory which is ambiguous can lead 
to a plethora of models, many of which may not capture the essential features of the subject 
domain at all. Study of these models in general cannot lead to a better understanding of that 
subject domain but may in fact misdirect the research and result in erroneous statements. 
The remainder of this paper will briefly describe a subject domain, select a language for 
a theory, pose the foundations for that theory, and present a model of it. The theory will 
address the operator in human-machine systems. 
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HUMAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS 
A human-machine system (HMS) is a collection of humans and machines which function 
together to achieve a goal or objective which could not be achieved consistently, efficiently, 
or safely by any of the components independently. Examples of HMS’s include driver- 
automobile systems, aircrew-aircraft systems, air traffic control systems, nuclear reactor 
control rooms, command and control systems, and automated office systems. 
In any HMS, the human operator plays an important role or he/she would not be there. 
Although automation has replaced many humans in such systems, there are some functions 
which machines are simply not yet capable of performing. This is partly due to some of the 
unique characteristics of human operators. 
First, the human operator, unlike most machines, is capable of performing a wide variety 
of tasks, often in parallel. The human is very good at detecting important events and 
responding to them in a timely manner. While the human has a limited channel capacity and 
cannot handle infinitely many tasks simultaneously, he/she is capable of prioritizing tasks 
and, at any moment, performing those operations that are most crucial to the objectives of 
the system. Finally, the human is a good decision-maker and planner. Based upon the 
objectives of the HMS, the human can lay out strategies and identify the sequences of 
operations that must be performed to achieve the desired outcomes. As long as machines 
remain unable to do these things efficiently and consistently, there will continue to be 
human-machine systems. 
World War II served as the stimulus for an ever-increasing interest in the human operator 
in human-machine systems. It was realized then, as it is realized today, that the human is 
a system component in many very important systems and the performance of the system as 
a whole depends to a great extent on the performance of the operator. Consequently, quite 
a bit of effort has gone into developing a better understanding of the human operators in 
HMS’s. A wide variety of theories of the human operators has resulted. Several of the more 
important ones will be considered now. 
One of the earliest systematic approaches to understanding and predicting human 
performance in HMS’s was based on information theory. Researchers, including Deininger 
and Fitts [S], Fitts and Posner [9], Elkind and Sprague [lo], and Senders [l 11, sought to explain 
human performance in terms of information transmission. Their efforts led to guidelines for 
instrument panel layouts and other design issues. 
Since many of the systems that humans control are linear in much of their behavior, 
control engineering theories were developed which described the operator as a servo- 
mechanism. The McRuer and Jex crossover model [12] described the human operator as a 
good servo, one whose gain is greater than unity for input frequencies less than the crossover 
frequency and less than unity for higher frequencies. This and similar linear and quasilinear 
theories were based primarily on classical control theory. One of the major manual control 
results to come out of modern control theory was the description of the operators in HMS’s 
as an optimal controller. Developed by Baron and Kleinman [ 131, the optimal control model 
assumes that the human operator is well-trained and therefore performs as an optimal 
servomechanism. 
Decision analysis methods were used by researchers, including Cohen and Ferrell [14], to 
describe the oeprator’s decision-making behavior. Typically, decision analysis theories 
consider the control alternatives the operator has to choose from and how those alternatives 
are selected. 
The methods of queueing theory have found wide application in describing the human 
operators. Earlier research concentrated on describing visual sampling of instruments as a 
process in which instruments queue up for visual service. Carbonell [15] and Carbonell et al. 
[ 161 present the results of such research. The queueing idea has also been applied to multitask 
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situations by Walden and Rouse [17]. Their theory states that tasks queue up for sevice by 
the operator. 
Discrete event theories of the human operators have served as the basis for Monte Carlo 
simulation models of human-machine systems. In such simulations, such as those described 
by Siegel and Wolf [18], events occur at random intervals and are processed according to 
service time distributions. Another application of the discrete event idea is through the use 
of Petri nets. Petri nets are directed bipartite graphs that have been widely used to describe 
systems performing sequential and concurrent activities. Peterson [ 191 provides an excellent 
survey of Petri nets. Schumacher and Geiser [20] use Petri nets to describe the human operator 
in multitask situations. 
A number of efforts have been made to integrate two or more of the above theoretical 
perspectives to more adequately address the wide scope of human operator capabilities. 
Muralidharam and Baron [21] combined decision. analysis and optimal control to describe 
the human operator in a remotely piloted vehicle system. A somewhat more abstract per- 
spective was developed by Johannsen and Rouse [22]. In their theory, the human operator is 
likened to a time-sharing computer system in which programs compete for computer system 
resources. The authors discuss how such a structure could be used to integrate a number of 
more specific methodologies, 
Most of the above theories of the human operator address very specific issues in very 
specific HMS’s. In other words, each theory is interpreted in only a very small class of models. 
Information-theoretic descriptions of the human operator address only information content 
and not knowledge organization or attention allocation. Optimal control theories cannot 
explain decision-making behavior. Discrete event theories make statements only about when 
events occur and how long it takes to process them, not about how they are processed. 
Consequently, while such theories have been quite successful in addressing the specific issues 
they were developed to address, they are generally not applicable to the diversity of behavior 
the human operator exhibits in most operational situations. 
Johannsen and Rouse [22] recognized this. They state that “. . . the success of models in 
limited domains has not had substantial impact in complex domains. . . designers have been 
known to claim that mathematical models of human behavior are not particularly useful . . .” 
(Note that Johannsen and Rouse use the term model in the sense that the term theory is used 
in this paper.) Their research is an important step in the effort to remedy the situation. 
Unfortunately, while their time-sharing computer theory is very wide in scope, it lacks the 
precision necessary to raise and address specific issues. In other words, the language in which 
the theory is constructed is too ambiguous to determine what structures do in fact qualify 
as models. The theory may apply to every HMS or it may apply to none. 
There is a need for a theory of the human operator rich enough to consider the human’s 
complex behavior in diverse situations, yet precise enough in language to be able to address 
specific theoretical and practical issues. The foundations for a candidate theory are presented 
in the next section. 
A THEORY OF THE HUMAN OPERATOR 
For a theory to be useful in the process of scientific inquiry, it must be stated in a language 
general enough to admit its interpretation by a large class of structures in the subject domain, 
yet it must be precise enough in speaking about that subject domain so that meaningful issues 
can be posed and addressed. To capture both generality and precision, the predicate calculus 
with set notation and some supplemental notation will be used. A brief review of set theory 
and the predicate calculus follows. For additional background, see Stoll [23]. 
A set is a collection of entities, each entity being called a member or an element of the 
set. If A is a set containing the elements a, b, and c, the following notation is used: 
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If x is an element in A, then x EA may be written. The set containing no members is called 
the null or empty set and is denoted 8. 
From the propositional and predicate calculi, the following notation will be used: 
(‘dx) 
(3x1 
(39 
A=B 
AoB 
AAB 
AvB 
1A 
3 
For all x 
There exists an x or for some x 
There exists exactly one x 
If A then B or A implies B 
A if and only if B 
A and B 
A orB 
Not A 
Such that 
Occasionally, additional notation will be used with the quantifiers. For example: 
(VXEAEIXEB) 
could be read “For all x (where x is an element of A) such that x is also an element of B . . .“. 
The concepts of the subset relation, set union, set intersection, and relative complement 
come from the set calculus and may be formally defined. 
A E Bo(Vx)(x~A)=z-(xEB) 
A U B= {xl(x~A) v (xEB)} 
AflB={xl(x~A) A (xEB)} 
A -B= {x((x~A) A 1 (xEB)} 
In English, A is a subset of B if and only if for all x, if x is an element of A then x is an 
element of B. The union of the sets A and B is the set consisting of all elements x such that 
x is an element of A or x is an element of B. The intersection of sets A and B is the set 
consisting of all elements x such that x is an element of A and x is an element of B. The 
relative complement of A less B is the set consisting of all elements x such that x is an element 
of A and x is not’an element of B. 
The power set of a set, A, denoted 
is the set of all subsets of that set. 
A Cartesian product of two sets is the set of all ordered pairs in which the first element 
in the pair is from the first set and the second element is from the second set: 
A x B = {(a,b)~(a~A) A (kB)}. 
A relation is a subset of a Cartesian product: 
RsAxB 
A = {1,2,3} 
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5 = ((1, l), (1,2), (1,3), (2,2), (2,3), (393)). 
.If R is a relation and (a, b)~ R the notation aRb is often used. Therefore, since (1,3)~ I, 
1 I 3. 
A function is a relation in which each element in the first set is related to only one element 
in the second set. That is if 
FEAxB, 
F is a function if and only if 
(Va)(Vb)(Vb’)((a, b) E F) A ((a, 6’) E F) = (b = b’). 
If this is true, the notation 
F: A-B 
is used and read “F maps A to B”. If (a, b)E F then the notation 
F(a) = b 
is quite common. 
These definitions generalize readily. For example a relation R or a function F could be 
defined such that 
R c A, x A, x . . . x A,,, 
or 
F: A, x A, x . . . x A,+B, x B, x ’ . . x B,. 
When a Cartesian product is defined on multiple indexed sets, as for R and F immediately 
above, a special form of notation may be used: 
A=A,xA,x.. . x A, = x {A& I m}. 
The theory of the human operator to be developed below is based on the assumption that 
a human operator in a human-machine system may also be described as a system. The 
following system definitions are based on those of Mesarovic and Takahara [24], Wymore 
[25], and Windeknecht [26]. 
A system S is formally defined as the Cartesian product 
scxx Y, 
where X is an input set and Y is an output set. Note that in this most general definition S 
is a relation and not a function. Theefore, without further specifications, S is nondeterministic 
and totally independent of any concept of time. 
A dynamic system is one whose input and output objects (X and Y) are defined on a time 
set having special properties. 
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Let T be a time set, linearly ordered by the relation 5. Let + be a binary associative 
operation defined on T and let 0 be an identity element of T for +. The relation I, the 
operation +, and the element 0 are formally related in the following manners 
(Vt’, t”eT)(t’< t”)o(‘i’t ET)(~‘+ t 5 t”+ t) 
(t’t E T)(O I t) 
That is, + preserves the 5 relation and 0 is a least element of T. To complete the discussion 
of T itself another relation < may be defined on T such that 
(t < t’)-L = >(t I t’) A (t #t’) 
Let A be an input alphabet and let B be an output alphabet. X and Y may then be defined: 
X G {xix: T+A) and Y c (yly: T+B}. 
X and Y are sets of input and output segments (or sequences) respectively. Then 
SGXX Y 
is a dynamic system since its input and output objects are defined on a time set. Elements 
of S are called behaviors. Ifs = (x, y) E S then x(t) and y(t) are the input and output at time 
t in behavior s of S. 
It is occasionally necessary to restrict input and output objects, and even systems, to time 
segments. The following notational conventions are used: 
T,,={tjt’<t}, T”={tlt<t’), T;:‘={tjt’<t<t”). 
For all XEX 
X,, = xlT,,, x” = xlT”, xi:’ = xlT;:‘. 
Corresponding notation may be used for Y, the output object and S, the system itself. 
Suppose that A is a set of input symbols that a human operator can receive and sense and 
that B is a set of output symbols that the operator can produce. Let X and Y be defined on 
a suitable time set as before. Then the operator in a human-machine system may be defined 
HGXX Y. 
But, again, H is not necessarily a function. In other words, without further specifications, one 
cannot in general predict the output produced by a human operator defined this way given 
a particular input. Formally, all that is required to correct this situation is an initial state 
object. Let C be a set of states. Then H may be defined as a function 
and knowing initial state and input, output may be identified. 
It is more meaningful to carry the notion of operator state beyond just the initial condition. 
Let Z be defined 
Z G {z/z: T-C}. 
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H:ZxX--+Y, 
and if h = (z, x, v) E H then z(t) is the state of H at time t in behavior h. z is called a state 
trajectory. 
It is important to point out that while only single-dimensional input, output, and state 
objects have been discussed, the definitions gereralize to the multidimensional case. That 
is, if 
A = A, x A, x . . . x A,, B = B, x B2 x . . . x B,,, C = C, x C, x ’ ’ ’ x C,, 
then x*(t), ~,~(t), and z2,(t) are input component 2, output component 13 and state 
component 27 at time t. 
Practically speaking, the function H may never be completely known. Instead, it may be 
necessary to generate lements of H, given initial states and segments or sequences of inputs. 
Ideally, the formal structures for doing this would correspond in a relatively straightforward 
manner with the way in which human operators actually organize their activities. For that 
reason, and since human operators frequently organize their activities through the use of 
procedures, a formal definition for a procedure will be given. 
Let 
H:ZxX+Y 
be a human operator where 
z E {z/z: T-q 
and 
c = c, x c, x . . . x c,. 
Let J~{1,2,3 ,..., k} and let C’ = x { C,l_j E J}. Then a procedure P may be defined 
P = {P#', t”E T) A (t’ < l”) A (pif: c x X+2’}. 
That is, P is a family of state transition functions which, given the state of H at the beginning 
of a time interval and the input over that interval, tell the values of certain, selected state 
components after that time interval. For all j E J, procedure P controls state component j. 
This will be denoted P(j) (P controls j). 
To allow certain further specifications to be made, a consistency condition must be 
imposed on members of the family of function, P. 
(Vt, t,, t,, t,, t44E T)(t, + t = f2) A (t, + I = t4) =s (Vc EC)(VX EX)(VX’EX)(W < t) 
((X(4 + 0 = X(h + 0) = (P::(C, x::) =pQk X’Q))). 
In other words, P is time invariant. An initial state and input segment will always result in 
the same final state regardless of when the actions occur. 
One additional bit of notation must be introduced here. It will occasionally be necessary 
to speak of particular state components which P controls. Let C’ = x(C,)j E J) as before and 
let C/EC’. Then (q&c’) is true if and only if q is the member of c’ corresponding in place 
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to that of C, in the Cartesian product. For example, let 
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C’ = c, x c,, x c,, x c,5 
and let c’ = (i,j, k, r). Then (j :‘C’). 
Procedures allow the generation of state trajectories, but there must be a mechanism for 
generating outputs as well. An output function Q for H may be defined 
Q: C+B 
At any time the function Q gives the output of H based on its current state. 
An event is a very specific change of state. An event E may be defined 
EcCxC 
Let h = (z, X, y) E H. Event E is said to occur at time t (denoted E( t )) if and only if 
(WE T)(Vt”E T:,)(z(t’) = z(t”)) A (z(t) # z(t’)) A ((z(t’), z(t))eE) 
That is, if H is in state c for a period of time and then transitions to state c’ at time t and 
(c, c’) E E, event E has occurred. 
The terms system, procedure, output function, and event have been defined and necessary 
auxiliary notation has been introduced. It is now possible to state the axioms of the theory 
of the human operator. 
Let H: Z x X+ Y be a human operator as before. X and Y may be single or multi- 
dimensional. The state object, Z, must contain at least four components. That is 
c = c, x c, x . . x c, 
and k 2 4. Let P* be a set of procedures defined on C and X, let Q be an output function 
defined on C and B, and let E* be a set of events defined on C. 
PN will be a set of procedure names in direct correspondence with members of P*. 
Members of PN and P* will be referred to with the same symbols. Context will clearly indicate 
whether a procedure (a family of functions) or its name is being referenced. Similarly, EN will 
be a set of event names in direct correspondence with members of E*. For each axiom an 
informal statement will be made, the axiom will be stated formally using the predicate 
calculus, then a brief explanation will be given. 
Axiom 1 
Each state component of H is controlled by one or more procedures. 
(ViE(1,2,..., k})(3P E P*)(P(i)). 
To generate behaviors of H, each state component must be computed. Since state 
components are controlled, and therefore determined, by procedures, there must be at least 
one procedure to control each state component. 
Axiom 2 and 3 require that 
Cl = 9(PN) c* = 9yPN) 
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Axiom 2 
At any time, the first state component contains the name(s) of one or more procedures 
which control each state component. 
(Vh = (z, x,y)~H)(Vt E T)(v,~{l, 2,. . . , k))(3P eP”)(P ~z,(t)) A (P(i)) 
z,(t) is the set of active procedures at time t. If P EZ,(Z) the procedure P is said to be active 
at time t, otherwise, P is inactive. The active procedures are just those procedures which can 
potentially affect system state. 
Axiom 3 
At any time, each state component is determined by exactly one procedure which is 
identified by the previous membership of its name in state component 2. 
(Vh=(z,x,y)~H)(V’t”~T)(Vi~{1,2,...,k})(3!P~P~)(3t’~T3t’<t”) 
A (Vt E Ti:‘)(P c&z*(t)) A (P(i)) A (z;(Y)& P:‘(z(t’), xi:‘)) 
z*(t) is the set of executing procedures at time t. If P EZ~(~) then P EZ,(?) and P is executing 
at time t. If P ez,(t) but P $zZ(f) then P is said to be suspended (active but not executing). 
At any time the executing procedures completely determine the state of H at the next instant 
of time. 
Axioms 4 and 5 depend upon the definitions of state components 3 and 4 as sets of event 
name/procedure name pairs. That is 
c, E (EN x P”) C, c (EN x P”) 
In other words, for any t, z3(t) and zq(t) consist of any number of ordered pairs in which 
the first element of each pair is an event name and the second element is a procedure name. 
Axiom 4 
At any time, a procedure is active only if it was initially active or if it was earlier specified 
in an event/procedure pair and the corresponding event occurred. 
(Vh = (z, x, y) E H)(Vt E T)(V,P E P”)(t > 0) A (f’ E z,(t)) 
=s (P EZ,(O)) v ((3t’ < t)(3E E EN)((E, P)~z~(t’)) A (E(r)) 
Procedures are activated according to a plan contained in the third state component. 
Elements of the plan specify an event which could occur and a procedure to activate if and 
when that event does occur. A procedure P, which controls the third state component (P,(3)) 
is called a planning procedure. 
Axiom 5 
If an event/procedure pair is present in the fourth state component and the event occurs 
when the procedure is active, the procedure becomes inactive. 
(V’h = (z, x,y)cH)(V’t’~ T)(VE gEN)(VP ePN)((E, P)~q(t’) A (E(f)) A (P ~z,(t’)) 
=s(3t”~T3i‘< ~“)(V~ET;:- {t’})(P$z,(t)) 
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State component 4 may be called a deactivation plan. Elements of the fourth state 
component are, again, event/procedure pairs. If a particular pair is present in the deactivation 
plan while the procedure is active and if the event occurs, then the procedure is deactivated. 
Axiom 6 
The executive procedure is a procedure which controls state components 1 and 2. It is 
always both active and executing at time 0. 
w,~~N)((f%(l)) * (L(2))) A (VA = ( z, x, Y> E ff)((PE E z,(O)) A (PEE 4)N 
Active procedures are those procedures which can potentially affect state. Executing 
procedures are those procedures which actually determine state. The executive procedure 
determines which procedures are active and which are executing. Consequently, to generate 
any behavior, the executive procedure itself must be both active and executing at the 
beginning of the behavior. 
Informally speaking, the executive procedure provides primary control for H. Through the 
executive actions, the behaviors are determined. These actions involve waiting for qvents. 
When an event is detected state component 3 (the plan) is searched. If an event/procedure 
pair is found in the plan in which the event in the pair is the event that just occurred, the 
procedure is activated. Similarly, active procedures may be deactivated according to state 
component 4. Then procedures are chosen to execute from the collection of active procedures 
specified in state component 1. In general, this may require arbitration since there may be 
several active procedures which control a given state component. This arbitration takes place 
according to a priority scheme unique to the particular model of the theory in question. After 
the executing procedures have been determined the executive resumes waiting for the next 
event. 
The axioms account for a number of properties which operators in human-machine 
systems possess. First, humans often use written or memorized procedures to direct their 
activities. As events occur and are detected, different procedures may be executed. When 
events occur that call for quick attention, lower-priority procedures may be interrupted by 
higher-priority ones (as in dealing with emergencies). Often, when the higher-priority 
procedures have been completed, the lower-priority ones may resume. All of this seems to 
be controlled by a higher-level mental mechanism which corresponds to the executive 
procedure. This mechanism assesses current conditions and allocates mental resources 
according to relative importance. In addition, the human operator plans ahead. Events which 
could occur are considered and actions which must be performed if and when the events occur 
are noted. 
A MODEL OF THE TAEORY 
The theory of the human operator consists of merely six axioms. It does not address 
specific operations in specific human-machine systems, but instead consists of a few 
statements which any model of the theory must satisfy. In keeping with the intentions of the 
research as well as to illustrate the axioms, a model of the theory will now be developed. 
The model chosen is a bicycle rider, the operator of a human-machine system which should 
be familiar to most readers. The rider of a bicycle typically must engage in several 
simultaneous activities. He plans ahead, moment-by-moment considers the relative im- 
portance of pending actions, and performs these actions accordingly. For the sake of clarity 
and conciseness, in the model only a limited class of situations will be considered and a 
number of simplifying assumptions will be made. The goal is to illustrate and to raise issues 
rather than to produce a mathematical structure of high resolution. 
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The bicycle rider sees the condition of the road ahead of the bicycle. The road may be 
clear, there might be some distant obstacle (such as a car blocking the road) or there might 
be a similar obstacle much closer. He also senses velocity. The bicycle might be stopped, 
moving slowly, moving at a comfortable cruising speed, or moving fast. 
The rider operates hand and foot controls. He may either grasp the handlebars or apply 
the brakes. He may pedal, pedal hard (to accelerate) or rest his feet on the pedals. 
In addition to state components necessary for applying the theory to this situation, another 
state component, that of mental alertness, will be included. The rider could be in a normal 
state, a danger state in which a distant object has been sensed and plans must be made to 
deal with it, a panic state in which the plan must be carried out, a safe state in which the 
plan was successful, and a recovery state in which actions are taken to resume normal riding. 
Seven procedures are used to organize the rider’s activities. The vision procedure (VP) 
senses road conditions and velocity. The planning procedure (PP) determines what to do if 
some sort of obstacle is detected. The rider uses the acceleration procedure (AP) to increase 
bicycle velocity and the deceleration procedure (DP) to decrease it. The cruise procedure (CP) 
maintains a comfortable cruising velocity and the stop procedure (SP) brings the bicycle to 
a stop. The executive procedure (EP) controls and coordinates the other procedures. 
Consequently, PN, the set of procedure names, can be defined 
PN = {VP, PP, AP, DP, CP, SP, EP) 
Several events can occur in the rider’s restricted world. A danger event (DE) occurs when 
a distant obstacle in the road is detected. A panic event (PE) occurs when the bicycle is close 
enough to an obstacle that some evasive action must be performed. A safe event (SE) occurs 
when the bicycle has stopped safely. A recovery event (RE) occurs when the object is no 
longer obstructing the path. A normal event (NE) occurs when conditions (velocity and 
roadway ahead) return to normal. Therefore EN, the set of event names, is 
EN = {DE, PE, SE, RE, NE} 
H, the bicycle rider, may now be formally defined. A, the input alphabet, is defined as 
A =A, XA, 
where 
A, = {clear, obstacle-far, obstacle-near}, 
A, = {stop, slow, cruise, fast}. 
A is the set of inputs H can receive. A, is the set of road conditions. A, is the set of velocities 
that can be sensed. B, the output alphabet, may be defined as 
B = B, x B, 
where 
B, = {grasp, brake), 
B, = {rest, pedal, pedal-hard}. 
B is the set of control actions the rider can produce. B, is the set of hand control actions. 
B2 is the set of foot control actions. 
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State is defined as 
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c = c, x c, x . . . x c,. 
C, represents active procedures. 
C, represents executing procedures. 
c, = 9yPN) 
Actually, C, could be more restricted since subsets of PN in which conflicting procedures 
appear cannot be the second state component. C, is for activation plans. 
C, = (EN x P”) 
C, is for deactivation plans. 
C, = (EN x P") 
C, is state of mental alertness as described previously. 
C, = (normal, danger, panic, safe, recover) 
C, and C, directly influence hand and foot output, respectively. 
C, = (grasp, brake) 
C, = {rest, pedal, pedal hard} 
The time set 
r={O,l,2 ,..., 299,300) 
representing time in units of 0.1 second will be used. Only behaviors covering 30-second 
intervals will be considered. Standard integer addition, +, and the familiar numerical 
relations I and < will be implicit in the discussion 
Input, output, and state objects are defined as 
x = (xix: GA} Y = (yIy: T+B} z = {zlz: T-rC), 
and the bicycle rider is then defined as 
H:ZxX-+Y. 
The events may be defined more precisely now. As before, the same symbols will be used 
to refer to both events and to event names. Context will clearly determine meaning. 
A danger event (DE) occurs when the rider’s mental alertness goes to danger. 
DE = {(c, c’)l(c, # danger) A (c; = danger)} 
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The panic event (PE), safe event (SE), recover event (RE), and the normal event (NE) are 
defined analogously as 
PE = {(c, c’)l(c5 # panic) A (c; = panic)) 
SE = {(c, c’)l(c, # safe) A (c; = safe)) 
RE = {(c, c’)l(c, # recover) A (c; = recover)) 
NE = {(c, c’)[(c, # normal) A (c; = normal)}. 
Recall that procedures are families of state transition functions that affect specific state 
components. For each of the bicycle rider model’s procedures, the purpose of the procedure 
will first be given. Next, a formal description of the family of functions will be presented. 
Since T is a discrete time set, it is possible to define each of the functions as one-step state 
transition functions. Then a formal predicate calculus description of the procedure will be 
given. Finally, the procedure will be described informally. 
The vision procedure, VP, senses the condition of the road ahead and the velocity of the 
bicycle. VP controls state component 5, the bicycle rider’s mental alertness. 
VP = {vp;+‘j(t E T) A (t < 300) A (VP;“: C x X;+‘+C,)} 
(Vh = (z, x, JJ) E H)(Vt E T 3 t < 3OO)(VP E q(t)) * 
(z,(t) = normal) A (x,(t) # clear) * (z,(t + 1) = danger) 
(zs(t) = danger) A (x,(t) = obstacle-near) * (zs(t + 1) = panic) 
(z5(t) = panic) A (x2(t) = stop) * (z,(t + 1) = safe) 
(zs(t) = safe) A (x,(t) = clear) = (z5(t + 1) = recover) 
(z5(t) = recover) A (q(t) = cruise) * (z,(t + 1) = normal) 
Otherwise, z,(t + 1) = z5(t). 
Informally, for any behavior of the bicycle rider, at any time (except the final time value, 
since the next time value would then be undefined), if the vision procedure is executing, the 
following is true. If the rider is in the normal state of mental alertness and an obstacle appears 
in the road ahead, at the next time instant the rider will be in the danger state of mental 
alertness. If, while in the danger state, the bicycle closely approaches uch an obstacle, the 
rider goes to the panic state. If the bicycle comes to a stop while the rider is in the panic state, 
he goes to the safe state. Then when the road becomes clear again he goes to the recover state. 
Finally, when a comfortable cruise velocity is again reached, the rider returns to the normal 
state. If none of the above conditions apply, his state remains unchanged. 
The planning procedure, PP, stores a plan to stop the bicycle in state component 3 and 
a plan to deactivate the required procedures in state component 4. In addition, it removes 
entries from these state components as events occur so that procedures will not be 
prematurely activated or deactivated later. 
PP= (pp;+'j(tET) A (t <300) A (pp;+': c X x;+'+c3 X cd)> 
(Vh = (z, x, JJ) E H)(Vt E T 3 t < 3OO)(PP Ez2(t) * 
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q(r) = ((DE, W) * 
z,(t + 1) = {(PI% DP), (PE, SP), (RE, W) 
z4(t + 1) = {(SE, IX’), (W SP), (NE, AI’), (NE, PP)} 
q(t) # {(DE, W) * 
q(t + 1) = q(t) - {(K fj(E(f)) A (f+ZlW) 
z,(t + 1) = q(f) - ((-5 P)((E(t)) A (P dm} 
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When the planning procedure first begins executing, the entry (DE, PP), which brought 
about its activation, will be in state component 3. Then PP will store entries in state 
components 3 and 4 to bring the bicycle to a stop if conditions deteriorate. A panic event 
(PE) will cause the activation of both the deceleration and the stop procedures (DP and SP). 
A recovery event (RE) will cause the activation of the acceleration procedure (AP). In 
addition, a safe event (SE) will cause the deactivation of the deceleration procedure. A 
recovery event will cause the deactivation of the stop procedure (SP). A normal event (NE) 
will cause the deactivation of both the acceleration procedure (AP) and the planning 
procedure (PP) itself. In addition, PP removes from state components 3 and 4 entries 
specifying events that have just occurred. 
The acceleration procedure, AP, is used to increase the velocity of the bicycle. It controls 
state components 6 and 7. 
AP = (q;+‘((t E T) A (t < 300) A (ap:+‘: C x X;+‘+C6 x C,)} 
(Vh = (z, x, y) E H)(Vt E T 3 t C300)(AP E zZ(t)) + 
z,(t + 1) = grasp 
(x2(t) = stop) =F. (z,(t + 1) = pedal-hard) 
(x2(t) = slow) * (z,(f + 1) = pedal-hard) 
(x,(t) = cruise) * (z,(f + 1) = pedal) 
(x2(t) = fast) = (z,(t + 1) = pedal). 
While accelerating, the rider grasps the handle bars. If the bicycle is stopped or moving 
slowly, the rider must pedal hard to bring it up to speed. If the bicycle is moving faster, it 
is only necessary for the rider to pedal with a comfortable degree of effort. 
The cruise procedure, CP, maintains the velocity of the bicycle at a comfortable level. It 
controls state components 6 and 7. 
CP = {q;+‘((t E T) A (t < 300) A (cp;“: c X X;+‘-+C6 X c,)} 
(Vh = (x, x, y ) E H)(Vt E T 3 t < 3OO)(CP Ez2(t)) = 
zg(f + 1) = grasp 
(x2(f) = stop) = (z,(t + 1) = pedal-hard) 
(x,(t) = slow) * (q(f + 1) = pedal-hard) 
(x2(t) = cruise) * (z,(t + 1) = pedal) 
(x2(f) = fast) * (z7(t + 1) = rest). 
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While cruising, the rider grasps the handle bars. If the bicycle stops or is moving slowly, the 
rider must pedal hard. At cruise velocity, pedalling at a comfortable level of exertion is all 
that is required. If velocity becomes too great, the rider simply stops pedalling. 
The deceleration procedures, DP, is used to slow the bicycle. It controls state components 
6 and 7. 
DP = {dp;+ll(t E 7) A (t < 300) A (dp;+‘: C x Xi+‘-C, x C,)} 
(Vlh = (z, x, y) E H)(Vt E T 3 t < 300)(DP E z2(t)) =r 
(x,(t) = fast) v (x*(t) = cruise) - (zg(t + 1) = grasp), 
(x2(t) = slow) v (x2(f) = stop) = (zg(t + 1) = brake), 
z,(t + 1) = rest. 
While decelerating, the rider grasps the handle bars until the velocity drops below the 
cruising velocity. Then brakes are applied. No pedalling is done. 
The stop procedure, SP, is used to bring the bicycle to a stop. It controls state components 
6 and 7. 
SP = (sp;+‘l(t E T) A (t < 300) A (sp;“: C x X:+‘+C6 x C,)} 
(Vlh = (x, x, y) E H)(Vt E T 3 t < 3OO)(SP E ~~(1)) = 
(zJf + 1) = brake) 
(z,(f + 1) = rest). 
While stopping, the rider applies the brakes and does not pedal. 
The executive procedure, EP, controls the activation, execution, and deactivation of 
procedures. It controls state components 1 and 2. 
EP = {ep:+‘((t E T) A (t < 300) A (ep:": C x X:+‘+C, X CJ}. 
Let R be the set of procedures which control state components 6 and 7 
R = (AP, CP, DP, SP} 
and let > be a priority relation defined on R 
>cRxR 
such that 
DP>SP>AP>CP. 
That is, the deceleration procedure has the highest priority in the group. Then 
Theories, models, and human-machine systems 583 
(V/z = (z, x, y) E H)(Vlt E T 3 t < 300)(EP E z?(t)) * 
(3P’EPN)(P’E W,) A (VP E W,)((P’ # P) e- (P’ > P)) 
z,(t + 1) = G, 
z,(t + 1) = (G, - (W, - {P’})). 
At any time, G, is the set of active procedures for the next instant of time. It is determined 
by considering currently active procedures, adding these procedures which are to be activated 
because of an event which just occurred and removing those procedures to be deactivated 
because of an event. W, is the set of those active procedures which control state components 
&and 7. P’ is the highest priority procedure in W,. That is, P’ is the highest priority active 
procedure which controls state components 6 and 7. 
The first state component at time t + 1 is simply the set G,. The second state component 
at time t + 1, the executing procedures, consists of the active procedures except that only the 
highest priority procedure in W, is allowed to execute. This assures that no more than one 
procedure ever “tries” to control the rider’s hands and feet. 
The output function for H is the function Q 
Q: C-+B 
(Vh = (z, x, y) E H)(Vt E T) 
Q(z<tN = (zdt), z,(t)) 
That is, the rider’s hand output has the same value as that of state component 6. The rider’s 
foot output has the same value as that of state component 7. 
To construct a behavior for H, an initial state must be given and a sequence of inputs to 
H must be provided. The following steps may then be used. 
(a) Set t = 0. 
(b) Determine the state at time t + 1 according to the rules given for each procedure. 
(c) Determine the output at time t according to the function Q. 
(d) Set t =t+ 1. 
(e) If t I 300, go to step (b). 
(f) Otherwise, stop. 
An example behavior is given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 gives the state trajectory of H 
in a behavior h = (z, x, y). Table 2 gives input and output for the same behavior. 
In this behavior of H at time 0, the executive procedure (EP), the vision procedure (VP) 
and the cruise procedure (CP) are active and executing. If a danger event (DE) occurs, the 
planning procedure (PP) will be activated. There is currently no deactivation plan in state 
component 4. The rider is in the normal state of mental alertness, grasping the handle bars 
and pedaling at a comfortable rate. The roadway ahead is clear and the bicycle is moving 
at a comfortable cruise velocity. Output is of course identical to state components 6 and 7. 
Conditions remain the same until time 30 (3 seconds) when a distant obstacle (say, a car 
blocking the road) is sighted (~~(30)). This causes the rider’s state of mental alertness to 
change to danger (z5(31)), which in turn brings about the activation and execution of PP at 
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Table 1. Bicycle rider state 
t 
0 
l-29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34-79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84-99 
100 
101 
102-I 19 
120 
121 
122 
123-219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
224228 
229 
23G269 
270 
271 
272 
273-300 
z,(t) 
{ EP, VP, CP} { EP, VP, CP) 
{ EP, VP, CP, PP} { EP, VP, CP, PP} 
1, 
{ EP, VP, CP} { EP, VP, CP} 
3, 
Z,(l) 
7, 
31 
3, 
{ EP, VP, PP, DP} 
{EP, VP, PP, SP] 
{EP, VP, PP, AP} 
z,(t) 
{(DE, W} 
>I 
7. 
7, 
i;;~l+ 
(RE: AP} 
3, 
1, 
{ (RE:‘AP)} 
G(t) 
0 
3, 
7, 
71 
{(SE,DP) 
(RF Sp) 
(NE, Ap) 
(NE, pp)} 
1, 
9, 
1, 
1, 
zs(r) z&) 
normal grasp 
71 37 
>, ,, 
danger 3. 
1, ,, 
1. 0 
z,(t ) 
pedal 
11 
,. 
1. 
,, 
3, 
1, 
3, 
panic 
1, 
3, 1, rest 
9. 3. 1, 
1, 3, I, 
,. brake .I 
,. 7, 11 
,. 1, .1 
safe ., ., 
7. 71 7. 
3, 
(1 
recovery 
7, 
7, grasp pedal-hard 
7, ,. 1, 
7, 3, ,, 
7, 3, >, 
3. 9, 7, 
normal 7, pedal 
,, 7, 7, 
3, ,, ,. 
time 32 (z,(32), ~~(32)). PP places entries to activate and deactivate the deceleration, stop, and 
acceleration procedures (DP, SP, AP) in state components 3 and 4 at time 33. 
At time 80, the bicycle has come near the obstacle (x,(80)). This causes the rider to panic 
(z&81)) and in turn causes DP and SP to be activated. Note that now, while CP, DP, and 
SP are all active, DP is the only one of the three allowed to execute since it has the highest 
priority. 
Velocity drops to slow at time 100 (x,(100)) and the deceleration procedure begins braking 
at time 101 (z,(lOl),y,(lOl)) as a result. 
At time 120 the bicycle comes to a halt (x,(120)) bringing the rider to the safe state 
(2,(121)), deactivating DP, and allowing SP to execute (z,(122), ~~(122)). 
When the road becomes clear again at time 220 (x,(220)) the rider starts up using AP and 
eventually returns to cruismg speed (x,(270)), after which PP, having completed the 
overseeing of the evasive actions finishes cleaning up state components 3 and 4 and becomes 
inactive. 
Figure 1 is an active procedure profile of h. It depicts executing procedures (solid lines) 
and suspended procedures (dashed lines) as functions of time. 
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Table 2. Bicycle rider input and output 
I x,(r) x*(t) y,(t) 
0 clear 
l-29 >, 
30 obstacle-far 
31 ,1 
32 >, 
33 9, 
34-79 1, 
80 obstacle-near 
81 7. 
82 31 
83 >1 
84-99 3, 
100 7, 
101 3, 
102-l 19 31 
120 3. 
121 3, 
122 >1 
123-219 ,, 
220 clear 
221 7. 
222 1, 
223 3, 
224-228 3, 
229 3, 
230-269 3, 
270 I, 
271 3, 
272 0 
273-300 7, 
cruise 
,( 
,, 
,1 
3, 
3, 
slow 
0 
stop 
0 
cruise 
3, 
7, 
grasp pedal 
3. 1, 
31 >, 
3, 7, 
,1 7, 
7. >, 
0 7, 
3, 1. 
3, 1. 
1, 1. 
3, rest 
3, 1, 
1, 31 
brake 7, 
(1 1, 
9, .1 
0 ,1 
3, 3, 
7. >, 
1, 91 
1, 0 
,, >, 
grasp pedal-hard 
,> 0 
,, 0 
,, 0 
3, 0 
,, pedal 
,, 0 
3, 3. 
Y*(t) 
EP 
VP 
; PP I I 
2 s CP 1 : 1~11~~111111~~1111~ 
: 
n DP I I 
AP I 1 
SP ,111 I 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 
TIME CO.1 sec.1 
Fig. 1. Bicycle rider active procedure profile. 
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IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 
The bicycle-rider model is an admittedly highly simplified one, yet it serves two important 
purposes. First, it illustrates the general relationship between models and theories. The bicycle 
rider, as described set-theoretically, satisfies the human operator theory, so it is a model of 
the theory. Equally important, it illustrates the human operator theory presented in an earlier 
section. 
As a result, several issues raised by the theory become evident. Of particular significance 
is that the human operator theory provides the potential to integrate several different existing 
theories of human operators in a single representation. For example, the bicycle-rider model 
could be extended to include an optimal control procedure for controlling the direction of 
the bicycle and a decision-making procedure to select from several alternative ways to avoid 
an obstacle. 
The careful reader will note “holes” in the model. Various initial state/input sequence 
combinations could be developed which would cause the model to exhibit irrational 
behavior-riding right into an obstacle, for example. But, after all, bicycle riders often do react 
irrationally, partly because they fail to plan ahead, partly because sometimes things just 
happen too rapidly for them to cope. The ability of the theory and its model to account for 
human error is an important advantage. 
The theory raises some interesting questions about goals. Although not directly addressed 
by the axioms, any planning activity must be done with respect to some goal or objective. 
Future versions of the theory must deal with this concept. 
Another matter not directly addressed is that of written procedures. Operators in HMS’s 
often use handbooks to guide them through procedure execution. Although the theory does 
not include this idea explicitly, it at the same time does not preclude it. Further investigation 
is required. Similarly, additional research should consider procedure synthesis, in which 
operators “write” their own procedures to deal with new situations. 
In summary, this paper has attempted to distinguish between theories and models and to 
show that both are important in knowledge development and refinement. A theory and model 
of the operator of human machine systems were presented. This theory and its models provide 
a means for understanding and predicting the behavior of the human in this important class 
of systems. 
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